A feebate on the purchase of new cars, the "Bonus/Malus", was introduced in France in 2008. The less polluting cars benefited from a price reduction of up to 1,000 euros, while the most polluting ones were subject to a taxation of 2,600 euros.
This paper estimates the impact on CO 2 emissions of the introduction in France of a feebate, the "Bonus/Malus écologique", in January 2008. We compute in particular the counterfactual emissions that would have prevailed in the absence of the feebate. For that purpose, we develop a simple demand model that combines car and annual mileage choices. This model accounts for consumers' heterogeneity in preferences, the differentiation of the automobile market, and the existence of rebound effects, while remaining very tractable. We estimate this model on an exhaustive monthly dataset of new car registrations. This dataset provides detailed information on vehicles but also on drivers. We can thus accurately take into account heterogeneity in taste due to observable characteristics of consumers. We also use a transportation survey conducted in 2007 that records in particular annual mileage for a large sample of French households. Our model and these two datasets allow us to recover choices both with and without the feebate system, and average emissions related to car use for a particular choice of car. An original aspect of our method is that we do not rely on list prices, but rather on a reduced form that combines the demand model and a simple price model. The reason for this is that list prices are typically modified once a year only, and are thus likely not to reflect the changes in transaction prices that occurred quickly after the introduction of the feebate.
A substantial shift towards the classes of automobile benefiting from a rebate occurred after the introduction of the policy. Nevertheless, we estimate the environmental shortrun impact of the feebate to be, in fact, negative. This disappointing result is mainly explained by overly generous rebates. As a result, the policy appears to enhance the total sales of new cars by around 13%, despite the slowing down of the economy observed at this period. This large scale effect translates into extra CO 2 emissions through the increase in mileage and the manufacturing process of these new vehicles. Reactions of French consumers actually exceeded the forecasts of the French government. Planned to be neutral for the State budget, the measure turned out to cost 285 million euros in 2008 because of its overwhelming success in favoring the choice of cars with low CO 2 emissions.
This suggests that automobile consumers may be very reactive to modest changes in prices (as also recently observed by Busse et al., 2010) . Even though consumers reacted massively to the policy, this reaction did not translate into a large decrease in the average 1 Overview of the Policy
The Feebate System
The feebate system on sales of new cars was introduced by the French government for all cars registered after the 1st of January 2008. The purchasers of new cars emitting less than 130g of CO 2 per kilometer benefited from a direct price cut on their invoice. The amount of the rebate varied, depending on the class of the vehicle (see Table 1 ), up to a maximum of 1,000 euros. The rebate actually rose to 5,000 euros for electric cars, but they represented a negligible share of the market at that time. Conversely, purchasers of cars emitting more than 160g of CO 2 per kilometer had to pay a tax of up to 2,600 euros. The system was neutral for cars emitting between 130 and 160 g per kilometer. The chosen classification corresponds to the one defined by the European Union for energy labeling on cars, except that the government split the A, C and E classes into two subclasses.
In practice, rebates apply to new cars ordered on or after the 5th of December 2007, while fees apply to vehicles first registered in France on or after the 1st of January 2008.
At the same moment, the government introduced a scrapping subsidy of 300 euros called the "super bonus" for automobiles more than 15 years old, provided that the purchaser bought a new vehicle emitting less than 160g of CO 2 . In 2008, this super bonus concerned only 5.4% of vehicle purchases benefiting from a rebate (see Friez, 2009 ), and we ignore it hereafter. This scrapping subsidy was raised to 1,000 euros and extended to 10 to 14 year-old cars in 2009, in order to dampen the economic impact of the crisis on the automobile industry. We shall not be concerned further with it here, as we focus on 2008 only. The feebate concerns all new car registrations, whether the purchaser is an individual or a firm. There is thus no incentive for companies to have their business cars (falsely) registered as the individual property of their employees.
The feebate policy was decided upon and then implemented at an unusually fast pace.
It resulted from a national environmental roundtable organized in Autumn 2007 by the newly elected president, the aim of which was to define the key points of government policy on ecological and sustainable development issues for the coming five years. 3 The policy measures, including the feebate system, were presented on the 25th of October 2007, for application almost immediately. This roundtable and the feebate policy came as quite a surprise, as they had not been mentioned during the electoral campaign, and the right-wing government party was not thought to give high priority to environmental issues.
In magnitude and scope, this "green" taxation scheme for the purchase of new cars by private owners has no precedent in France. Some measures had already been taken to increase the population's awareness of the environmental costs of motor vehicles. But for private users, they either focused on very specific segments of the market, or were wide in scope but marginal in magnitude. Examples include an income tax reduction for the purchasers of hybrid vehicles, or a very small tax on the most polluting vehicles (around 100 euros for cars costing on average 35,000 euros). In contrast, the feebate introduced at the end of 2007 applied to all cars, the rebate representing up to 8.8% of the list price, and the penalty rising to as much as 14.1% of the list price.
The objective of the feebate system was twofold. First, it aimed to shift consumer demand towards low CO 2 -emitting cars. Second, it aimed at encouraging manufacturers to develop greener vehicles. To better achieve this second purpose, it was stated from the outset that the thresholds of the classes were to be gradually lowered in future, at a pace allowing manufacturers to adapt their products (5g of CO 2 /km every two years).
Descriptive Evidence on the Impact of the Policy
French consumers have reacted strongly to the feebate system. 4 This reaction has led to a replacement of polluting cars by the less polluting ones targeted by the tax rebates, but also, more surprisingly, to a net increase in the total sales of new cars. These impacts do not appear to be due to seasonal effects or changes in the macroeconomic situation. By contrast, we do not observe, in the very short run, any clear evidence of a sharp break in CO 2 emissions of cars supplied.
To start with, the changes in the market shares of the energy classes after the reform came into effect were impressive. While class B only represented 20% of sales at the end of 2007, its market share reached nearly 50% at the beginning of 2009 (see Figure 1 ).
Over the same period, the market share of class E-fell from nearly 15% to 5%. These changes induced a significant impact on average emissions (see Figure 2) Vehicles affected by a fee This sharp rise in sales could however be temporary and due to changes in decisions about vehicle replacement. Because of price changes, there may have been a decrease in the optimal lifetime of smaller cars and an increase in the optimal lifetime of bigger ones, so that many individuals with small cars found it optimal to replace them at the beginning of the period, while a large portion of individuals with bigger cars postponed their replacement. But if we focus on sales from March to May 2008, a large part of these adjustments should already have taken place. This is supported by the fact that we do not observe any rise in the average level of CO 2 emissions a few months after the introduction of the feebate (see Figure 2) . Moreover, aggregate data suggest that the potential decrease in automobile lifetimes did not completely offset the increase in total sales. For instance, the estimated number of personal cars increased by 225,000 units between 2007 and 2008, and the share of French households owning at least one car also increased, from 82.4% to 82.7%.
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The exact extent of the supply-side reaction to the feebate is difficult to assess. Data on the supply of new cars are not available. Several clues indicate that in the first months of 2008 this reaction was small, however. As the policy was announced just before its implementation, manufacturers did not have time before January 2008 to adjust their production to the reform. Even if it is technically possible to modify horsepower (and thus CO 2 emissions) quickly, the vehicle with its new characteristics must be certified before being distributed. This process typically takes several months. More substantial technological changes are likely to take even longer. A rough quantitative analysis of the number of patents in the corresponding domains (in the innovation patent classification, F02B, F02D et F02M for fuel engines and B60L for electric ones) does not show any particular acceleration during this period. This result is also consistent with the one of Pakes et al. (1993) , who observed a two-year gap between the increase in the fuel price following the first oil crisis and the corresponding technical innovations. We also analyze the evolution of average emissions of cars that are sold each month, without weighting each product by its sales, so as to eliminate demand-side effects. 
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Sources: dataset on the registration of new cars (CCFA). Note: we suppose that a model is available for sale at a given month if we observe at least one sale at or before the given month and one sale at or after the given month. To avoid boundary effects (at the beginning or at the end of the period, only vehicles with enough sales are included, and these vehicles tend to have lower CO 2 emissions), we drop the first and last six months. The overall amount of CO 2 emitted by vehicles depends not only on the composition of the fleet but also on mileage and on the production of the cars themselves. In what follows we take into account all these elements in the estimation of short-run and long-run effects of the measure on CO 2 emissions. The short-run effect corresponds to the difference between CO 2 emissions with and without the policy, between March and May 2008. We focus on this period because January and February are affected by the "undershooting" effect mentioned previously. The long-run effect corresponds to the variation in emissions per trimester in a long-run scenario defined below. This effect is probably the most relevant parameter, since in the short run the policy only affects new cars, which in each month represent less than 1% of the whole stock of cars. In the long run, with the progressive replacement of the whole stock, the policy is expected to yield larger effects.
The identification of the long-run impact relies on stronger assumptions, however.
Let us first define the short-run effect of the policy. Let d ∈ {0, 1} denote the policy status Finally, we take into account emissions caused by the process of manufacturing new cars, and let M j denote the emissions caused by producing car j (so that by definition, M 0 = 0).
The emissions of a household with policy status d satisfy
Then the short-run effect of the policy on total carbon dioxide emissions satisfies
where n is the number of potential buyers. To take into account heterogeneity among individuals in both the purchase of cars and mileage driven, we separate individuals according to some observable characteristics X, namely their labor market status, type of geographical area and income group (see Section 3). Letting X ∈ {1, ..., K}, we then
where, for d ∈ {0, 1}, we let
A decomposition of the overall impact into its several components helps to better understand the effects at stake. We denote by A(1), N x (1) and M the average emission of new cars with the policy, the average mileage driven by individuals with characteristics x using new cars with the policy, and the average production emissions of these new cars, respectively. We let ∆s xj = s xj (1) − s xj (0) denote the impact of the policy on the market share of j among individuals with characteristics x. From Equation (1), we obtain:
∆s xj
Manufacturing scale effect
The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation
The first component (composition effect) corresponds to the change in the composition of new cars in favor of less CO 2 -emitting cars. If the policy is well-designed, this component should be negative (thus contributing to a decrease in the overall level of CO 2 emissions). For instance, we expect the sales of the less polluting cars, i.e. those for which Besides, the decomposition makes it clear that the policy impact depends on a scale effect.
If total sales increase because of the policy (namely, if new cars and annual mileage remain constant each quarter after the beginning of 2008.
Thus, we abstract from potential transitory effects in sales, assuming that sales between March and May 2008 already correspond to a steady state. As mentioned previously, it is likely indeed that most of the transitory effects due to vehicle replacement adjustments have already taken place. With these two assumptions in place, the only difference from the short-run scenario is that the whole fleet of cars has now been replaced.
Under these assumptions, long-run effects for group x on quarterly emissions satisfy
where s xj (d) denotes the share of individuals of type x equipped with model j with policy status d in this long-run scenario. As before, we neglect emissions corresponding to other means of transportation here. In a steady-state equilibrium, the share of car j in the whole fleet and its share in the flow of new cars are related by
where T xj (d) is the average lifetime of vehicle j when bought by individuals of type x under policy status d.
Using ∆ s xj = ∆T xj s xj (1) + T xj (0)∆s xj , (3) and (4), we obtain, as previously, the decomposition
Rebound effect
The change in emissions due to the production of new cars over a quarter is the same as in the short run, whereas the change in the composition effect is far larger, the first term
The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation inside brackets being multiplied by T xj (0) (around 80 quarters on average in our sample).
This underlines the fact that the whole fleet is replaced in the long run. The rebound effect is also increased by the same scale factor, while the fleet scale effect is multiplied by an even larger one, as it is not offset anymore by the fact that in the short run, new cars replace older, more polluting ones. The replacement rate effect corresponds to potential changes in renewal choices. We expect that vehicles burdened with a fee are kept for a longer period than those benefiting from a rebate, so that their share in the whole fleet is larger than their share in total sales, partially offsetting the impact of the policy (since ∆s xj ∆T xj < 0). On the other hand, longer average lifetimes means that the increase in total sales due to the policy does not increase the share of individuals owning a car that much, countering the fleet size effects. This replacement rate effect is thus potentially ambiguous.
Data
The Table 2 ). were not yet adjusted to the reform at the beginning of 2008. This hypothesis is supported in our dataset, where no clear pattern in the evolution of list prices emerges (see Table A.2 in Appendix A.1). We do not observe systematic differences between classes of emissions in the evolution of list prices over the period of the reform, though the feebate policy should lead to an increase in list prices (excluding the feebate) for cars benefiting from rebates and a decrease for those with fees.
The new cars registration dataset not only provides information on the car, but also on its owner. This allows us to take into account in a simple way the heterogeneity in taste of customers for differentiated products. We observe in particular the labor market status, the age, and the city in which the owner resides. Based on this information, we define 20 groups of customers according to their participation in the labor market, the type of area in which they live (urban or rural) and their income group (5 groups). This last information comes from the French income tax data, which provide the distribution of income by age class at the city level. We impute to each purchaser the median income of his age class in his city, using fiscal data. This amounts to considering the 20 groups of consumers as different markets. Usually, the purpose of defining different markets, by geographical boundaries for instance, is to provide exogenous variation in the model. Here, we do this rather to account for observable heterogeneity in the car choice model (see Subsection 5.2). participation rate and type of location, computed using the Transportation Survey. Not surprisingly, these individuals are on average older, belong to wealthier households and work more often than the rest of the population. This underlines the importance of accounting for consumers' heterogeneity. There is a price to pay for our approach, though.
Since the markets we define are small (5% of the French adult population over a trimester), some observed market shares can be zero and cannot be used in the estimation, which could result in a selection bias. This is why we restrict ourselves to 20 groups of consumers and do not include all vehicle characteristics in the definition of our products (see Appendix A.1 for a discussion). Table 3 displays the average mileage of cars depending on their characteristics and those of the owners. Results confirm the importance of taking heterogeneity in the yearly mileage of individuals into account.
6 The median income is available only for cities with more than 50 households. It is decomposed by age for cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. If the buyer lives in a city with less than 10,000 inhabitants, or if his/her age is unknown, we impute the median income of the city. Sales to individuals living in cities of less than 50 households, which correspond to 5% of the data, were dropped.
The Environmental Effect of Green Taxation
Drivers who choose a heavy (and thus large) car, or those who choose one with a diesel engine, cover many more kilometers per year than others. High-income people, who work or who live in rural areas, also use their car more intensively. 
The Identification Strategy
As the decomposition (2) makes clear, the identification of short-run effects requires the econometrician to recover the market shares, average mileage and outside emissions that would have prevailed in the absence of the policy. For that purpose, we rely on a simple model that relates mileage, cost of travelling and choice of car. We also impose a nested logit specification for modeling market shares. Identification is then achieved, basically, by using shifts in the market shares following the introduction of the feebate. We assume that, apart from their price, cars' characteristics were not affected by the policy in the short run. The identification of long-run effects also requires computing vehicle lifetimes with and without the policy. We adjust car lifetimes using a simple model of replacement rate.
A Model of Car Choice and Mileage
To model rebound effects but also the effect of the policy on market shares, we consider a discrete-continuous choice model of car choice and mileage, following Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Goldberg (1998) . Our identification strategy differs substantially from theirs, however, since we do not use the micro-level data of the Transportation Survey to estimate the car choice model, but rather the market-level CCFA dataset. We do so for two reasons. First, the subsample in the Transportation Survey of individuals who bought a new car just after the reform is too small to yield accurate estimates. Second, many automobile characteristics, including purchase price, are not available in this survey. These issues would greatly complicate the estimation of car choice with these micro-level data.
We let U it (j, N ) denote the indirect utility of individual i with characteristics X i = x when choosing at quarter t the vehicle j and anticipating that he will travel N kilometers during this quarter. We assume that
where y it denotes the income of i, p jt is the transaction price of vehicle j (including the feebate if there is one), c jt is the average cost per kilometer of vehicle j and e ijt represents the valuation by the individual of observable and unobservable characteristics of vehicle j. The indirect utility of not buying a new car (the outside option 0) writes similarly with p 0t = 0. We suppose that 0 < γ x < 1 and α x < 0, so that utilities are increasing, concave functions of N . The dependence on x of (β 1x , β 2x , γ x ) reflects the heterogeneity in the way people value the corresponding characteristics of the car.
We assume that the average cost per kilometer corresponds to current costs, so that that the set of vehicles will evolve with time. We come back to this issue later.
Average Mileage
Individuals are assumed to maximize their utility both in N and j. Focusing on the choice of N first, the optimal anticipated mileage N * ijt for a given model j satisfies
This relationship highlights rebound effects. As soon as γ x < 1, individuals will increase the mileage they drive following a reduction of the cost per kilometer of their car. We assume that individuals are rational, so that actual mileage satisfies the same equation as 
where ν it is independent of the choice Y it (d) conditional on X i , E(ν it |X i ) = 0 and the distribution of ν it does not depend on t.
The important restrictions in Assumption 4.1 are that the distribution of the error term does not depend on t, and that it is independent of the choice of car. These restrictions and Equation (7) yield
where
We can therefore identify γ X it by a simple regression, using the Transportation Survey.
The cost per kilometer is estimated using the fuel economy of the car and the average fuel prices (diesel or petrol) at the county level (French départements) over the three month period before the interview. 
where E (exp(ν it )|X it = x) does not depend on t by assumption and is therefore identified using the Transportation Survey.
Market Shares
Plugging N * ijt into (6) and letting µ x = αx γx−1 β 2x (γx−1) γxαx γx , the utility for i of choosing j at date t is equal to
Let us write e ijt = ξ xjt + η ijt , where ξ xjt denotes the average valuation of observable and unobservable characteristics of the car by group x and η ijt is an individual-specific taste for j. To obtain realistic substitution patterns, while keeping the model simple to estimate, we rely on a nested logit assumption on the (η ijt ) j=1...J . The first nest is the set of all new cars, while the second corresponds to the outside option. The underlying idea is that consumers first choose to buy a new car or not, and then if they do so choose, select a model (see for instance Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012 , for a similar sequential choice for a durable good). An advantage of this model is that it can be estimated very simply. A standard alternative is random coefficient models (see Berry et al., 1995) , which is popular since it allows for heterogeneity of purchasers even when no information on these purchasers is available. Here, we have already captured heterogeneity in consumers' preferences since our data allow us to estimate different models for each kind of consumer.
Besides, even if we consider a basic segmentation of the automobile market, our model fits accurately the observed market shares, as shown in Subsection 5.1.
The nested logit specification leads to this simple market-level relationship between equilibrium vehicle prices, market shares and cost per kilometer at period t:
Estimating this equation by OLS is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it is likely that ξ xjt is correlated with prices even once controlled for observable characteristics, since ξ xjt includes for instance unobservable car quality. To get rid of fixed effects, we time- right after the introduction of the policy. As mentioned already, it is unlikely that the manufacturers could have adjusted their supply so quickly. Thus, most of the observed change can be attributed to price changes following the feebate, or specific effects of the feebate itself through consumers' valuation of CO 2 emissions for instance. Formally, we make the following assumption. Hereafter, Z j denotes the fee of vehicle j under the feebate policy (so that Z j < 0 if j actually benefits from a rebate). The second issue when trying to estimate (10) is that we do not observe transaction prices but list prices, which, as indicated before, appear to lack reliability. Moreover, measurement errors are likely to be nonclassical, as they may be correlated with feebates.
Thus, usual instruments such as the sum of characteristics of the other products may fail in this context. To solve this issue, we posit the following flexible model on transaction prices. Hereafter, we let Z S j denote the sum of the fees applying to vehicles produced by the firm that produces j. 
where f 1 (0) = f 2 (0) = 0.
Equation (11) captures the fact that when fixing the price of j so as to maximize its profit, the firm should take into account its effect on the profit flowing from j but also from the other cars it produces. This can be seen as a linearization of the price equation
resulting from an oligopolistic model with product differentiation and multiproduct firms (see details in Appendix A.4.2).
To estimate the demand model, the idea is to replace transaction prices by their expression in (11). This strategy is convenient as it is both very easy to estimate and does not require any instrument, provided that the following condition holds.
Assumption 4.4 (Exogenous residuals in market shares and no systematic trend in the short run) E(ε xj |Z j , Z S j , c jt 1 , c jt 0 ) = 0, where
The residual ε xj can be interpreted as the evolution, for a constant fuel price, of the valuation of vehicle j if the feebate had not been introduced. Assumption 4.4 states that this evolution is unrelated to the vehicle's feebate and its cost per kilometer. It also rules out potential seasonal effects. We provide a robustness check of this assumption in Subsection 5.3.
Finally, we show in Appendix A.4 that under a linear specification, the change in the log market shares just before and after the feebate can be approximated by
where (z l ) l=1...7 denote the different nonzero possible values of the feebate. By Assumption 4.4 and because the parameter γ x is already estimated by the mileage equation (8), we can identify by simple OLS these parameters. In turn, these coefficients allow us to recover the counterfactual market shares at period t 1 , s xjt 1 (0), viz. the market shares that would have prevailed without the feebate policy (see Equation (A.3) in Appendix A.4).
Outside Emissions
The short-run effect depends in part on the emissions of individuals who decide not to buy a new car. As the decomposition (2) makes clear, we have to recover the counterfactual average emissions E x0 (0), but also the actual ones E x0 (1), since we do not observe the Under Assumption 4.5, we get (see Appendix A.4)
where I f is the ratio between fuel price of type f ∈ {1, 2} at period t 1 and at period t 0 , and E x0t 0 ,f (0) are the average outside emissions for individuals such that F 0t 0 (0) = f :
As Equation (13) 
Long-run Effects
The identification of the long-run effects of the policy requires stronger restrictions. As Unfortunately, as far as we know, no French data provide recent information on cars'
lifetimes at a micro level. As a result, we have to make quite restrictive assumptions.
The first is that we posit a constant average lifetime across vehicles before the introduction of the feebate, T xjt 0 = T t 0 . In this case s xjt 0 = T t 0 s xjt 0 for all j ≥ 0, so that by summing over j, we have
and we can recover T t 0 using the Transportation Survey. Our computation gives us an average value of around 80 quarters, consistent with official statistics. The monthly flow of new cars indeed represents 0.5% of the stock of cars that are less than 15 years old, corresponding to an estimated lifetime of 67 quarters. Because official statistics are available only for cars less than 15 years old, and are not restricted to cars owned by households, this figure probably underestimates the true average lifetime we are interested in here.
We assume that average lifetimes at t 1 without the policy would have remained the same as in t 0 , so that T xjt 1 (0) = T t 0 . To compute lifetimes with the policy T xjt 1 (1), we consider a model derived from Engers et al. (2009) . If the purchase of a car occurs at quarter t, let us assume that at quarter t + k, the car can either be sold on the secondary market at a price p jt+k or kept, generating a current net surplus of v jt+k . The value W jt+k of a car j of age k then satisfies the simple relation:
where ρ denotes the quarterly discount factor. Assuming that prices perfectly adjust at equilibrium, we get
where W s j represents the scrapping value of car j. As shown by Engers et al. (2009) , the consumer keeps the car while its price remains above the scrapping value. Let us denote by T jt the lifetime of the car. We assume that the current net surplus decreases at a constant rate r over time, so that v jt+k = v j r k . We then get the following system:
After a little algebra,
For standard values of W s j (i.e., between 0 and 200 euros), the second term in the righthand side is negligible. Writing Equation (14) with and without the policy, we obtain T jt 1 (1) as a function of T jt 1 (0):
This equation shows that individuals who choose vehicles benefiting from a rebate (so that p jt 1 (1) < p jt 1 (0)) tend to replace their vehicle more often (T jt 1 (1) < T jt 1 (0)). Basically, this is because the value of the vehicle reaches its scrappage level more quickly, as the vehicle is initially cheaper. In the right-hand side, we approximate the car price without the policy by the observed price minus the malus, p jt 1 (0) p jt 1 (1) − Z j . The importance of the adjustment also depends on the quarterly discount factor r of individuals (supposed to be independent of x here), the (quarterly) depreciation rate in the utility flow corresponding to the usage of a vehicle, r, and sale prices p jt 1 (d). In practice, we set r = ρ = 0.987, corresponding to an annual interest rate (or depreciation rate) of 5%.
5 The results
Estimation of the Mileage and Market Share Equations
This subsection presents details on the estimates of the mileage and market shares equations. We first present results from the estimation of Equation (8), which relates the annual mileage to the cost per kilometer, controlling by observable characteristics of households X (see Table 4 ). As we did not find any evidence of heterogeneity in x of γ x , we estimate a model with constant γ. The estimated γ is then plugged into the market shares equation (12). The estimates from Equation (8) are also used to compute average mileage through Equation (9) and average outside emissions, using Equation (13). We thus obtain γ −1 −0.53. As discussed in Subsection 4.2, this estimate may however be biased. Recall that the cost per kilometer c Y it t is proportional to f jt A Y it t , where f jt is the fuel price for vehicle j three months before the date of the interview. Identification through Equation (8) relies on regional and temporal variation in fuel prices (as we use local fuel prices and there is variation in the date of the interview), which can be considered exogenous, but also on the selection of the car through the CO 2 emissions per kilometer A Y it t . It may thus depend on unobserved characteristics of the drivers.
An overview of the related results in the literature helps to assess the plausibility of our estimated value of γ − 1. The literature has mostly focused on how fuel prices affect fuel consumption. A change in fuel prices has a direct impact on the cost per kilometer c Y it t but also potentially on A Y it t , as individuals may decide to change their cars according to fuel price fluctuations. Thus, denoting by ζ N (resp. ζ A ) the elasticity of mileage (resp. of average emissions per kilometer) to fuel price, the long-run price elasticity of fuel consumption is equal to ζ N + ζ A . By Equation (8), we get
We thus expect γ −1 to be smaller than the short-run price elasticity of fuel consumption, but larger than the long-run elasticity (if ζ N + ζ A > −1). Our results are consistent with this prediction. The usual estimates of the short and long-run elasticities lie between -0.3 and -0.2 and between -0.8 and -0.6, respectively (see, e.g., Graham and Glaister, 2002, for a survey). While the evidence is rather scarce for France, two recent studies based on micro data (Clerc and Marcus, 2009, and Calvet and Marical, 2011 ) obtain similar results. Our estimate therefore seems broadly consistent with the literature. As we rely on this parameter to calibrate the rebound effect later on, it is nonetheless important to assess the sensitivity of our final estimation to this estimation. We consider below, as a robustness check, an extreme scenario where drivers do not respond at all to the change in the cost per kilometer, by setting γ = 1.
In a second step, we estimate the reduced form of our nested logit model, using Equation (12). Results are displayed in Table 5 . As expected, market shares of vehicles benefiting from a bonus increase at the expense of those incurring a penalty. The penalty effect is actually more pronounced for classes E+ and E-than for classes F and G, which may seem surprising. It suggests that these coefficients not only reflect price effects, but also environmental concerns on the part of consumers. Classes F and G only correspond to very large cars, for which consumers were probably already aware of their environmental effect, whereas the introduction of the feebate may have acted as a negative environmental signal for cars in class E. Finally, and as expected, the estimated coefficient of the cost per kilometer is significant and negative (-3.67). Sources: dataset on the registration of new cars (CCFA). Notes: OLS Estimates of Equation ( 12). The standard errors are computed by bootstrap (with 1,000 simulations) and take into account the fact that γ is estimated in Equation (12). Significance levels: * * * 1%, * * 5%, * 10%.
In order to check whether our model accurately predicts market shares, we compare those These counterfactual market shares may still differ from the observed markets shares in 2007, as they neglect the change in the prices of cars that would have been observed between these two quarters, absent the feebate policy. This estimation would have required measuring the price elasticity β 2x that we do not estimate. Still, the differences between observed market shares at the end of 2007 and the predicted one using the model, absent the feebate and with the same fuel prices as observed at the end of 2007, are small and not significant (see Table 6 ). The biggest gap is observed for the share of classes C+ and D, but corresponds to only 1.5 percentage points. Overall, the average gain in terms of CO 2 emissions of new vehicles is equal to 4.0%, which perfectly matches the observed gain on our subsample. Another important indicator to look at is the prediction of the model on global sales. According to our estimates, the policy has increased sales by 13.2%. This effect is substantial, but consistent with the empirical evidence that shows an increase in sales of 13.4% between September-November 2007 and March-May 2008 (see Subsection 1.2). It will prove to have large consequences on the effect of the policy on total emissions. Total 100.00 100.00
Sources: dataset on the registration of new cars (CCFA) and authors' computations. Notes: market shares sum to 100% because we do not include the outside option. The observed market shares correspond to September-November 2007. The counterfactual market shares are obtained from the observed market shares in March-May 2008 and parameters estimated by Equation (10), setting the feebate to zero and using the average fuel prices in September-November 2007. Standard errors computed by bootstrap (with 1,000 simulations).
Effect on CO 2 Emissions and Decomposition
The overall effects of the policy, both in the short and long run, are displayed in Table   7 , while the decomposition of these effects is presented in Table 8 9.2% * * * Notes: we consider a price of 32 euros for a ton of CO 2 . Standard errors were computed by bootstrap (with 1,000 simulations). Significance levels: * * * 1%, * * 5%, * 10%.
As expected, we obtain far larger effects in the long run, even when taking into account the potential impact of the feebate on cars' lifetimes. With our calibration, we obtain substantial lifetime changes. The average lifetime of class B vehicles decreases by 14%
while that of class G cars increases by 24%. For instance, starting from a lifetime of 20 years without the reform, we obtain a lifetime of around 17 years for a class B vehicle with an initial price of 12, 000 euros, and of 30 years for a class G vehicle with an initial price of 30, 000 euros. However, these effects are not large enough to offset the increase in sales. Overall we estimate the whole stock to rise by 8.9%. Note that if the lifetime adjustments of cars were not taken into account, the increase would be as high as 14%.
While in the short run, the main component of the negative impact is the emissions of the manufacturing process, travelling emissions due to the increase in the size of the fleet predominate in the long run. As a result, we estimate that the introduction of the feebate accounts for an increase of 1,048.5 Kilotons of CO 2 per quarter, corresponding to an increase by 9.2% in total automobile emissions. Notes: we consider a price of 32 euros for a ton of CO 2 .
Standard errors were computed by bootstrap (with 1,000 simulations). Significance levels: * * * 1%, * * 5%, * 10%.
Our model allows us to identify the effect of feebate schemes that differ from the one in the long run when taking into account renewal effects. This is mainly due to the fact that total sales do not increase much in this scenario. As a result, the fleet size effect is sharply reduced. As with most of the parameter estimates, the estimate of ∆ LR is not significantly different from zero, however. 
Robustness Checks
Our results suggest that the feebate policy actually increases CO 2 emissions. These results are provocative, so it behooves us to check their sensitivity to our underlying assumptions. First, and as stated before, we restrict the estimation periods to months around the introduction of the feebate policy in order to avoid changes in the supply induced by the policy and dramatic modifications of the macroeconomic situation. As a result, however, we may capture seasonal effects. Sales in the automobile market are cyclical, and if these cyclical effects vary with the type of car, the dummies measuring the emission classes Z j in Equation (A.2) will capture part of these seasonal effects. To assess the importance of these effects, we perform a falsification test using Without seasonal effects, the coefficients corresponding to the emissions classes should be equal to zero. Table 10 shows that the estimates of these coefficients are far smaller Second, the assumption that over this short amount of time, manufacturers do not react to incentives created by the feebate may be challenged. We therefore simulate a situation where the policy would lead to a 5% reduction of all average emissions. This reduction is very large, as it corresponds to the average decrease in the average CO 2 emissions of new vehicles proposed by manufacturers between January 2003 and July 2008 (see Figure   6 ). Considering the decompositions (2) and (5), this reduction of course decreases the composition effect, but also increases the rebound, fleet size and manufacturing scale effects. At the end, and as expected, the first effect dominates the others, but our basic conclusion remains unchanged. We obtain an increase of 757 kilotons of CO 2 per 10 Apart from seasonal effects, this may be due to long-run evolutions in preferences for low emitting quarter instead of 1,030 in the long run. This computation fails however to account for possible dynamic effects in consumer demand. In reality, people are likely to modify their vehicle choice and replacement rate because they rationally expect an evolution of the fuel consumption of vehicles. As the feebate may modify the supply side in the long run, this dynamic aspect can also contribute to the long-run effect of the policy. It is however likely that the overall impact of this channel is small compared to the change in the supply of new cars.
Finally, our results are based on an estimate of the price elasticity of miles traveled where households' mileage is regressed on the annual operating cost of their vehicles. This estimate may be biased, for instance because we neglect unobserved heterogeneity in the valuation of mileage (α x is only group-specific). Households expecting to drive more would probably purchase more efficient cars. To assess how much this bias might alter our final results, we use an alternative specification that neglects the rebound effect in the demand model (12), by setting the parameter γ to 1. Results, displayed in Table 11, show that the policy still leads to an increase of CO 2 emissions in the short and long run under this very favorable assumption. Overall, the impact of the policy is very disappointing. Yet this result does not invalidate feebate systems as efficient tools for environmental policy. French consumers have reacted strongly to financial incentives created by the policy. The problem arises rather from the design of this feebate. A crucial parameter of a feebate system is the "pivot point" that divides vehicles incurring fees from those attracting rebates, and the rate that specifies the fee or rebate as a function of distance from the pivot point (see Greene et al., 2005) .
In the French case, it looks as though this pivot point was set too high in terms of average CO 2 emissions. The rebates were also too generous. As our policy exercise shows, an adjustment in these rebates might easily lead to a decrease in overall CO 2 emissions. As the first-order terms in the policy effects are manufacturing or fleet size effects, the most important focus in order to ensure a reduction of CO 2 emissions would be to calibrate the policy in order to decrease, or keep constant, total sales.
One limitation of our study, due to a lack of appropriate data, is that we do not include manufacturers' reactions. Even if, as mentioned above, these reactions are unlikely to modify our conclusions, to stimulate innovation in favor of less polluting cars was another objective of the measure. Besides, consumers may modify their vehicle choice and replacement rate because they rationally expect technology, especially as regards fuel consumption, to evolve. Developing a dynamic model of supply and demand for new cars incorporating these technical changes remains a real challenge, one that we leave for future research.
A Appendix

A.1 Definition of Products
As usually in this literature, a product is defined by a set of characteristics. An important issue, then, is to choose which characteristics one ought to retain in this definition. On the one hand, if products are defined by a narrow array of characteristics, very different items are mixed together, possibly leading to strong aggregation biases if the underlying model of demand is not linear, which is the case here. On the other hand, retaining too wide an array of characteristics leads to small market shares for each product, or even null markets shares, as exactly similar cars are often not sold in every month. The theoretical model presented above links the logarithm of the market shares with the observed characteristics. Thus, null sales are not used, which leads to a selection bias.
11
As a compromise, we select the brand, the model, the type of fuel, the type of carbody (urban, station wagon, convertible, etc.), the number of doors and its class of CO 2 emissions. Thus, we adopt a slightly more restrictive definition of a product than Berry et al. (1995) . Even so, the dispersion of the remaining characteristics (such as price)
within each product is not that small compared to the overall dispersion (see Table A .1).
A more restrictive definition of products (by including, e.g., horsepower) would reduce this dispersion, but at the cost of increasing the proportion of null sales. Our definition allows us to keep this proportion of null sales relatively small on the whole population of buyers (15% of the models with positive sales between September and November 2007
were not sold between March and May 2008).
11 The existence of null sales is a consequence of the finiteness of the French population, and does not invalidate the model. If the market share of a product is 10 −9 , it is very unlikely that it is sold during a given quarter in France. To compute market shares, we also need to define potential markets. We assume here that they correspond, for the subpopulation with characteristics x, to the number of individuals with a driver's license at quarter t. We thus assume that individuals cannot purchase more than two cars during a quarter.
0 µ x and η ij = η ij for j = 1..J. While we observe c γx j for each new car, this is not the case for the outside option, and thus −c γx 0 is a random term integrated in the residual. The term ξ xj represents the common valuation of individuals of type x for unobservable characteristics of product j. Here we make the normalization ξ x0 = 0.
As stated below, we use a nested-logit distributional assumption on the residuals ( η ij ).
We assume two nests: one constituted by the outside option 0, and the other by all new cars. η i0 is independent of ( η ij ) j=1...J , while these latter are correlated through a common factor υ i :
The (υ ij ) j=1...J are independent, follow a Gompertz distribution, and are independent of υ i . The ( η ij ) j=0...J also follow a Gompertz distribution. The distribution of υ i is implicitly defined by those of η ij and υ ij and this independence restriction. Cardell (1997, Theorem 2.1) shows that there exists a unique distribution satisfying these conditions, for each value of σ x ∈ [0, 1].
Considering each type of consumer x as separate markets, the market shares s xj of product j satisfies (see, e.g., Berkovec and Rust, 1985) :
where g(j) denotes the group of product j and D g = k∈g exp (δ k /(1 − σ x )) for any group g. This yields This definition holds at each period of time. We differentiate it between t 1 (after the introduction of the feebate policy) and t 0 (prior to its introduction) and use the linear price model states by (4.3). Moreover, we assume for simplicity (although not needed for identification) a linear specification for σ x /(1 − σ x )(= x λ), −f 1 (z)β 1x /(1 − σ x ) (= 7 l=1 1{z = z l }θ l ) and −f 2 (z)β 1x /(1 − σ x ) (=zθ S ). We finally obtained (12), where the residual ε xj corresponds to ξ xjt 1 − ξ xjt 0 + (p t1 (0) − p t0 (0))β 1x . p t0 (0) is the actual price at period t 0 and p t1 (0) is the counterfactual price that would have prevailed absent the feebate policy.
We can recover the counterfactual market shares s xj (0) using our estimates and the observed market shares (s xj (1)) j=0...J (we omit t here for simplicity). To see this, note that where p(0) is the vector of the equilibrium prices without feebates, mc(0) is the vector of marginal costs without feebates, s(.) is the function that maps a vector of price to the vector of market shares, and Ω 0 denotes the matrix whose (j, j ) entry is ∂s j /∂p j (p(0)) when j and j are made by the same firm, 0 otherwise.
After the introduction of the feebate, a similar equation is generated, but now the firm receives ( p j − Z j − mc j ) instead of p j − mc j for each sale of j (recall that p j denotes the final price and Z j denotes the fee, with Z j < 0 in case of rebates). Thus, Ω 1 p(1) = Ω 1 (Z + mc (1)) − s(p(1)), (A.5) where Z denotes the vector of fees and Ω 1 is the same as Ω 0 , but derivatives are taken at p(1) instead of p(0). Supposing that marginal costs remain constant, neglecting the difference between Ω 0 and Ω 1 and using a first-order Taylor expansion of s(p(0))−s(p(1)),
we obtain (A.6) where Ω denotes the matrix whose (j, j ) entry is ∂s j /∂p j (p(0)). Under our nested logit model, and neglecting heterogeneity according to X, we get ∂s j ∂p j = β 1 1 − σ s j s j 1 + σ s 0 1 − s 0 − 1{j = j } .
Using these expressions and developing the matrix products in (A.6), we obtain, for all
with b = 1 + σs 0 /(1 − s 0 ) . This shows that ∆p j = Z j /2 + C f , with
where s f = j ∈J f s j . Hence, for a given Z there exists a constant C (with C = 0 when Z = 0) such that
As market shares are defined on a trimester basis, the total market share of firm f s f is expected to be close to zero. At the first order, the price change of model j, ∆p j , thus depends linearly on the fee incurred by model j, Z j , and on a weighted sum of the fees incurred by models produced by the same firm. Provided that the market shares s j of these models does not vary too much within the same firm, the change in price can be approximated by the price model in (11). Note that weighting each fee Z j by the corresponding market shares s j would make the equation endogenous, so we consider an equal weighting scheme here.
A.4.3 Equations (9) and (13) Using notations of the model described in Section 4, let
Note that by Assumption 4.1, g x does not depend on t. Moreover, it is identified using the residuals of Equation (8). We then have
= exp(τ (x))c γx−1 jt 1 E (exp(ν it 1 )|Y it 1 = j, X it 1 = x)
= g x exp(τ (x))c γx−1 jt 1 , where the third equality stems from Assumption 4.1. Equation (9) follows.
First, by the law of iterated expectations, E x0t 1 (0) = P (F i0t 0 (0) = 1)E x0t 1 ,1 (0) + P (F i0t 0 (0) = 2)E x0t 1 ,2 (0). (A.7)
Second, by Equation (8) 
